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LILIANA BARAKOŃSKA, MAŁGORZATA NITKA
University o f Silesia
A Reading of Distance 
in the Kantian Sublime
Kant’s text comes to be read from the vantage-point of footnotes and 
examples, its voice-overs. The discourse of The Critique o f Judgement or, more 
precisely, “The Analytic of the Beautiful” is, in fact, instituted by a footnote 
which by being anchored to the title rather than the text comes before its letter. 
And as Jacques Derrida says this gloss “touches on a difficulty so decisive that 
one cannot see why it does not constitute the principal text of which it forms 
the ground bass, that is, the unwritten or underwritten space” 1.
It is adversaria, sundries written on the side, as if on the edges: citations and 
examples or observations reduced to the lower ranks of the text that augment 
a dossier of (the discourse of) the sublime, and form its back-bone.
The derivation of the example as of the thing taken out is always exotic. It 
enters the text as an expatriate, removed from its native space, and an envoy 
sent from afar. The example comes as one of many: its function is to represent 
which is the business of an ambassador, the one that arrives from the other 
territory to body it forth. The foreign service entails attachment: the example 
develops a relationship of contiguity with the thesis/statement whose truth it is 
to assert, whose legitimacy it is to corroborate. Apart from its existence of 
a typical instance the example signifies an object or action which should/should 
not be copied or followed; its vocation is twofold since it accommodates 
imitation as well as intimidation, both being the directions of pedagogy.
The code of the exemplary conduct, the protocol, furthermore specifies the 
didactic nature of the undertaking: the example is in the main to illustrate, that 
is explain a point. The pedagogy of the example is, however, mis-leading. In the
1J. Derrida, Parergon. The Truth in Painting, trans. G. Bennington and I. McLeod (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1987), p. 70.
vicinity of the example one must be on the guard as it tends to take a wayward 
course walking out on the argument, steering clear of what it was to 
demonstrate. Even Kant, the philosopher always vigilant of mystagogues, falls 
prey of the deceptive teaching of the instance, takes a false step induced by its 
impostor guidance.
The examples picked by Kant to illuminate the concept of the sublime 
always come as visible imports carried from abroad of other texts or 
commonplaces/hearsay. Their secondhandness does not fail to label itself with 
a tag of “as it is said” introducing the example of S t Peter’s in Rome or “what 
Savary reports” that announces the case of the Pyramids. Some other examples 
are voices of Burke and Addison, taken and alchemized, as if following the 
Burkean concept of distance and modification as imperative for the sublime2. 
The Critique o f Judgement speaks in multi-far-ious tones, tongues and genders, 
in a modulating pitch of argument and the low-key of footnotes. Its polyphony, 
is set by Kant who has to know the score of the tonal montage3.
The mechanism of the passages with the Pyramid and St. Peter’s inserts 
evinces one of many a priori somersaults turned in/turned by the work: when 
the philosophical argument serves to illustrate the examples and bear witness 
to their accuracy. Kant’s theory of apprehension and comprehension offers 
then an explanation of Savary’s remark that
in order to get the full emotional effect of the size of the Pyramids we must avoid coming 
too near just as much as remaining too far away. For in the latter case the 
representation of the apprehended parts (the tiers of stones) is but obscure, and produces 
no effect upon the aesthetic judgement of the Subject In the former, however, it takes the 
eye some time to complete the apprehension from the base to the summit; but in the 
interval the first tiers always in part disappear before the imagination has taken in the 
last, and so the comprehension is never complete4.
The sublime introduces the Analytic of the Distance: the distance between 
the cognitive faculties, the I and the Pyramids, the comprehension and its 
completion, the thesis and the example, the example and the text, the text and the 
land, the genre and the space (The example comes from Savary’s book which is 
Letters from Egypt, and the letter, by definition, is always a genre of distance).
2 E. Burke, A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin o f Our Ideas o f the Sublime and Beautiful. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 36:
When danger or pain press loo nearly, they are incapable of giving any delight, and are simply terrible; but a t certain 
distances, and with certain modifications, they may be, and they are, delightful, as we every day experience.
3C£ J. Derrida, “Of an Apocalyptic Tone Recently Adopted in Philosophy”, in Oxford 
Literary Review 6.2 (1984), trans. J.P. Leavey, Jr. pp. 3—37.
41. Kant, The Critique o f Judgement, trans. J.C. Meredith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1973), §26, pp. 99—100. All the quotations will come from this edition and will be marked by the 
initial CJ and appropriate § and page number.
The distance spellbinds the discourse: the discourse of/on the sublime turns 
the discourse of/on distance, whose code is the code of spacing.
The full emotional effect calls for a regulation/discipline of distance, the 
distance is subject to negotiation, some middle ground which could bind 
apprehension and comprehension, make them enter into an alliance, move at 
the same pace, has to be found. (“In apprehension a manifold of sensible 
intuitions is ru n  t h r o u g h  and  held,  to g e th e r ,  whereas in comprehension 
past sensible intuitions are held in memory alongside current ones, thus 
enabling the mind to grasp w ho le  ser ies  of  p e r c e p t io n s . ” 5) The quoted 
stipulation of “neither too far nor too near” as mandatory to obtain “the full 
emotional effect” becomes unexpectedly controverted by what was designed to 
be its illustration. Being on overly distant terms with the object disqualifies or 
precludes any aesthetic judgement: too great remove abridges the apprehen­
sion which occurs as if at one go and in an incompetent manner leading to “no 
effect”. “To see an object distinctly and to perceive its bounds is one and the 
same thing” 6: the excessive distance frustrates the idea of infinity by reducing 
the magnitude to contours, translates it into outlines, clarity and consequently 
littleness: a clear idea is “another name for a little idea” 7.
The proximity of the Pyramids engages the eye in a study of vastness, 
scrutinized piecemeal. The close-up makes the apprehension fall out of step 
with the comprehension whose incongruity secures the desired collapse of the 
imagination. The tour of contemplation turns a journey of oblivion in progress 
of which “the parts first apprehended begin to disappear from the imagination 
as this advances to the apprehension of yet others” (CJ, §26, 99). To view the 
Pyramids from a close perspective is to watch them purblind, that is 
sand-blind. The onward course obliterates, blots out, the previous view; the 
space of the apprehension/comprehension is the sabulous space of a desert, 
whose landscape complements the Pyramids, the infinite surface susceptible to 
erasure, however only partial, and covering over, like Freud’s Mystic Writing 
Pad which offers “an ever-ready receptive surface and permanent traces of the 
inscriptions that have been made on it” 8, like Rousseau’s brain:
... my brain became as sand 
Where the first wave had more than half erased 
The track of deer on desert Labrador,
Whilst the fierce wolf from which they fled amazed 
Leaves his sight visibly upon the shore...9
5 P. Crowther, The Kantian Sublime (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 96.
6E. Burke, A Philosophical..., p. 58.
. 7 Ibid.
®S. Freud, “A Note upon the ‘Mystic Writing-Pad’ ”, in The Pelican Freud Library, vol. 11, 
trans. J. Strachey (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1984), p. 431.
9P.B. Shelley, The Triumph o f Life, 11. 404-^108.
“The comprehension is never complete” as the viewer cannot cope with the 
excessive nearness, cannot take in a whole, his imagination is sand-stormed, 
overpowered, as incapable of embracing a totality. Imagination not commen­
surate with the reason’s concept of the object as a totum defers the 
accomplishment which remains forever far-off. The crisis of imagination evokes 
the presence of the sublime. The comprehension is built on sand.
Distance in the Kantian sublime is always a distance between man and 
stone. It is a distance which establishes and regulates a relationship between 
the body of man and the body of stone. Of stone which is introduced in the 
form of the pyramids and then punningly multiplied in the example of the 
Church of Saint Peter in Rome. (The Church, itself of stone, is named after the 
one who is the Rock).
The distance which mediates between man and stone inaugurates a pet­
rifying relationship/a relationship of petrification as the visitor touring the 
places of stone is astonished, petrified, turned to stone. “One would almost say 
medusé”10 as petrification is the business of Medusa, one of the Gorgons. The 
masks of the Gorgons were worn by priestesses to the triple goddess of the 
Moon in order to intimidate and divert the profane from penetrating the divine 
mysteries. Thus the mask of the Gorgon serves to hold aloof, keep at 
a distance; its monstrous grimace is that of an official admonition like the 
lapidary/lapidarian words of Isis, words which evoke eternity and are inscribed 
on the Temple thus obstructing entrance to another stone structure. “Perhaps, 
remarks Kant in a footnote, there has never been a more sublime utterance, or 
a thought more sublimely expressed, than the well known inscription upon the 
Temple of Isis (Mother of Nature). ‘I am that is, and that ever shall be, and no 
mortal hath raised the veil from my face’ ” (CJ, §49). It is precisely the moment 
of lifting, unveiling, revealing that Kant is concerned or rather disconcerted 
about: we must not disclose, discover as that would afford a vision, a seeing, 
and that must be avoided. We must not see, we must a-vert our eyes to elude 
being turned to stone in the face of Isis, the returning figure of Kant’s writings, 
the figure which functions as a premonition, a forebodying of the eternal. We 
must keep in mind the lecture on or reading of eternity Kant advances in Das 
Ende aller Dinge where eternity is qualified in terms customarily associated 
with stones: time, mutability, transitoriness, all which pertains to the phenome­
nal world, the whole nature is paralysed, petrified, literally, turned to stone.
To approach the suprasensible notion of eternity we perform a detour 
through that which is perceptible by the senses, a detour which takes us 
through a landscape of stone, landscape furnished with monumental executions 
in stone: the pyramids, St. Peter’s Church, the writing of Isis. It is a landscape 
of hewn stone, polluted by the tool of man, and thus chiselled against the letter
10 J. Derrida, Parergon..., p. 142.
of the law which, ex post facto, Kant enforces when he postulates: “we must not 
point to the sublime in works of art (e.g. buildings, columns and the like) where 
a human end determines the form as well as the magnitude ... but in rude 
nature” (CJ, §26, 100). Kant provides an example only to contradict himself, 
almost in the same breath, and yet, there is a delay: he displays the 
man-sculptured stone b e fo re  imposing restrictions on it, as if suspending the 
law, deflecting it, putting it in parentheses (as he does with buildings, columns 
and the like).
Let us delay our journey for a while and pose a question about the 
metanarrative which warrants Kant’s obsession with stone imagery. What is it 
that Kant seems to r e m in d  us of by way of highlighting, privileging, elevating 
the stone? Why does his high-handed gesture always appear to d e m o n s t r a t e ,  
the m o n u m e n ta l ,  the monumental which puts in mind: which reminds, but 
also monitors, admonishes, the monumental which demonstrates the mon­
strous? The monumental connotes threat and coercion, it seems to overpower 
our senses as it intimates the monstrous which, according to Kant, qualifies an 
object which by its size annihilates and reduces to nothing the end which 
constitutes its concept. The monument Kant erects cripples our senses, 
mutilates our bodies, brings them to a standstill, to the double stillness of 
Atropos, who arrests the tropic movement of the body as well as of language, 
imposing the motionless and silence of death. The monument in Kant’s writing 
comes as a funerary monument. The stone is a monition of death, of death to 
come and of death which has already taken place. The sublime negotiates the 
distance between man and stone as the distance between man and death.
We should not forget, however, that the space of the sublime is imaginary, 
fictional as we ourselves project the sublime into nature: our experience of pain 
and danger is merely hypothetical. According to Kant:
We may look upon an object as fearful, and yet not be afraid of it, if  that is, our e timate 
takes the form of our simply picturing to ourselves the case of our wishing to offer some 
resistance to it, and recognizing that all such resistance would be quite futile.
(CJ, §28)
To illustrate his point Kant once again evokes the stony landscape:
Towering rocks, menacing rugged cliffs ... make our power of resistance of trifling 
moment in comparison with their might But, provided our own position is secure, their 
aspect is all the mote attractive for its fearfulness.
(CJ, §28)
The provision made in the name of safety seemingly concerns itself with the 
body,, its totality and inviolability. The body must remain distant. Distance 
here is defined in terms of security and shelter, which seems to entrench and 
isolate the body in a far more radical manner than Burke does when he
postulates that “danger or pain” should not “press too nearly” 11. Burke’s 
stipulation against nearness becoming too oppressive locates the body at the 
indeterminate distance delineated by the ambiguity of “too”; whereas-Kant 
removes the perceiving subject first away from nature without him and then 
still farther away from nature within him into the seclusion of his own mind. 
This double retreat results in man being a refugee from nature within and 
without him to the extent that he may actually risk exposing his body to 
danger (one must remember the prominence Kant gives to the, as he claims, 
ennobling state of war). Thus the body becomes entangled in the intricacies of 
distancing as now distance between the body and the rock is adjusted by the 
tension of the conditional “as if’ which de-shelters or un-shelters the body and 
opens it onto the moment of the dangerous.
It is already obvious that our detour will be impeded, halted, maybe even 
rendered impassable by the imagination besieged with stone. The stone soon 
becomes an insurmountable obstacle, a stumbling block, a difficulty for 
imagination which, in its interminable progress, is unable to meet the demand 
to grasp absolute totality, the demand imposed on it by reason. Imagination is 
unequal to the task of presenting the infinite in the finite. The faculty of 
representation refuses to make present, it frustrates the logocentric desire for 
unmediated presence. Instead, it presents its own limits, bounds, its own 
deficiency as it recoils when, to quote J. Addison, “after a few faint efforts, 
imagination is immediately at a stand, and finds herself swallowed up in the 
immensity of the void that surrounds it” 12.
Addison, while narrating the scene of imagination being overwhelmed, 
incapacitated, rendered powerless, makes use of very powerful images. The 
scene is dramatically staged against a backdrop long ago appropriated by the 
imagery of the sublime which privileges the abyss as presentation of the 
sublime. It seems ineluctable that the discourse on the sublime should already 
be implicated in the sublime, should lack the necessary detachment, disinteres­
tedness, and hence should be referred to as the discourse of the sublime, 
discourse which itself speaks the language of the void, chasm and abyss, 
discourse which puts itself en abyme.
The Kantian problematic of the abyss, which derives from the unbridgeable 
gap between faculties, between the faculty to conceive and the faculty to 
present, questions the symbolic relation between the concept and the image. As 
the imagination fails to present any object which would correspond with 
a concept, the image and the concept or, in other words, the signifier and the 
signified, are “doomed” to stay apart from one another. Their state of being 
apart conditions a special kind of distance between them, distance enmeshed
11 E. Burke, A Philosophical..., p. 36.
12 J. Addison, Critical Essays from “The Spectator", Essay No. 420.
in the complexities of parts and departures. To understand the relationship 
between the symbolic order and distance, let us take recourse to the early 
history of symbol.
For the Greeks, the symbolon was a piece of pottery or earthenware that was broken in 
two prior to someone’s (usually a warrior’s) voyage. One of the pieces remained at the 
site of departure while the other was carried by the traveller and “voyaged” with him. 
Upon his return, the traveller’s piece of pottery served as a sign of recognition and as 
proof of his identity when it was rejoined with its matching complement. The word 
symbol referred to each of the pieces as well as to the act of putting the two pieces 
together: Gr. symballo =  to put together13.
The moment of putting together, the moment of accord, of identity never 
arrives as in the aesthetic of the sublime there is no relation of analogy or 
resemblance between the image and the concept. The sublime, which is not 
contained in a finite form nor in the infinite idea, is brought about at the 
moment of rupture, at the moment of incommensurability which, to borrow an 
architectural metaphor used by Freud to describe a style of writing, is 
“c o lo s s a l  and p y r a m i d a l ” 14.
The sublime dramatizes the bounds of one’s capacities as its presence 
perforce makes one aware of the inadequacy of imagination. This frustrating 
knowledge becomes a cautionary reminder that “the world as infinite totali­
ty” 15 lies not within the I’s ken. The experience of the sublime extends to the 
subject the trauma of deficiency and noncompletion. “The sublime in one of its 
aspects is ... this chastening, humiliating power, which decentres the subject 
into an awesome awareness of its finitude, its own petty position in the 
universe, just as the experience of beauty shores it up” 16. In the latter the
compatibility of mind and reality is validated as the faculties of cognition
(imagination and understanding) are united in a harmonious accord while the 
sublime generates roughness and turmoil which dislodge the imagination,
throw it out of joint, call it into question.
The condition of the beautiful is a mode of repletion which spells 
completeness. Its topos is a sealed space of closure, a space of motherly 
protection. In the presence of the beautiful the faculties concur and their 
harmony brings about complacency, peace of mind. Beauty is a peace-keeping 
force. Peacetime is to be distrusted as the season in which there hold sway “the 
spirit of commerce, ignoble greed, cowardice and effeminacy”. Peace is a state
13 E! Rashkin, “Tools for a new Psychoanalitic”, in Diacritics, winter 1988, p. 47.
14 S. Freud, “The Interpretation of Dreams”, in The Penguin Freud Library, vol. 4, trans. 
J. Strachey (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1991), p. 403.
*5 T. Eagleton, “The Kantian Imaginary”, in The Ideology o f the Aesthetic (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1990), p. 89.
16 Ibid, p. 90.
of having a home, a dwelling place, as well as of things being at home. 
Economy, as an ability to run a household, also pertains to the feminine 
province of the domestic. Peace marks then the decline of the masculine and so 
does the beautiful.
' The distinction between the beautiful and the sublime articulates itself as 
the divergence between the feminine and the masculine, as well as between 
peace and warfare. The military aspect of the sublime makes its appearance in 
Burke’s Inquiry... where he registers the noise of artillery in unison with the 
excessively loud, one might say thundering, voices of Nature whose alarmingly 
dense volume can disconcert, untune, the imagination. Also Kant brings 
together Nature and war as danger zones conducive to the experience of the 
dynamical sublime.
War itself, provided it is conducted with order and a sacred respect for the rights of 
civilians, has something sublime about it, and gives nations that carry it on in such 
a manner a  stamp of mind only the more sublime the more dangers to which they are 
exposed ...
(CJ, §28, 112— 113)
Soldiery and warfare challenge the I’s feelings, themselves proclaiming a state 
of war between the faculties, the state favourable to the sublime. As Eagleton 
remarks the sublime is the province of the martial and the masculine, 
which fields become curiously yoked in the name of Savary, the author of 
Letters from Egypt whose book, among other things, inspired Napoleon’s 
military campaign in Egypt and in which another Savary, a French general, 
took part17.
The presence of the sublime proves critical for the imagination, it brings 
a breach of its peace, rendering it destitute/out of place and engaging it in 
a tug-of-war with reason. The condition of warfare is that of estrangement; to 
go to war is to abandon home. The strategic value of every crisis proves, in the 
long run, beneficial: the collapse of imagination is imperative for the sublime to 
take place as only the moment of its failure can validate the out-distancing 
power of reason, the recognition of which can, in turn, lead to an armistice and 
a homecoming.
17 A footnote to the Polish edition of The Critique acts subversively since its underpage 
dealings attribute the comment on the Pyramids to the general and thus cancel the distance 
between the two Savarys. The footnote does not comply with the glossary code whose ranks 
it breaks by failing to be a signature tune of academic discourse.
